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ABSTRAKSI 
Negara merupakan jaringan yang menghubungkan antara masyarakat (principal) 
dengan pihak- pihak yang mereka pilih sebagai wakil mereka (agent). Dengan posisi ini, 
pemerintah merupakan pihak yang dominan dalam menentukan dan menegakkan 
peraturan dalam negara tersebut (the rule of the game). Berdasarkan teori agensi, negara 
memiliki peran sebagai nexus dari kontrak yang terjalin di dalam sistem pemerintahan. 
Karena informasi yang tersedia tidak simetris, maka seringkali terdapat potensi bagi 
pemerintah untuk melakukan aktivitas oportunis. Berdasarkan konsep mengenai 
desentralisasi fiskal, kekuatan fiskal pemerintah daerah terletak pada kemampuan mereka 
untuk mengelola pajak dan pengeluaran. Pajak sendiri merupakan aspek terpenting untuk 
mengevaluasi kekuatan fiskal suatu pemerintahan. Terkait dengan berjalannya otonomi 
daerah, pemerintah daerah juga harus memikiki kemampuan untuk memperoleh 
pendapatan. Salah satu elemen penting dalam mengukur derajat otonomi suatu daerah 
adalah kemampuan suatu daerah untuk menarik pajak dari masyarakatnya. Namun 
demikian, hingga saat ini rata-rata penerimaan pajak di seluruh daerah di Indonesia 
masih relatif kecil. Oleh karena itu reformasi pajak perlu dilakukan untuk meningkatkan 
penerimaan pajak pemerintah sekaligus menghindari terjadinya ekspoitasi berlebih yang 
merugikan kepentingan principal. 
Kata kunci: The role of the state, tax reform, fiscal decentralization. 
 
Many
1
 economists have argued that the 
role of a state is an important feature in 
developing and industrial countries (Alston, 
1996, World Development Report, 1997 and 
2002). State is understood as a network of 
relational principal-agents contracts between 
the constituents (the principal) and their 
representatives (agents) or state can be 
understood as a nexus of long-term relational 
contracts between individual. In democratic 
government there are two stages of principal-
agent relationship. In the first stage, voters are 
the principals and political actors (individuals, 
                                                          
1  This paper is a part of my thesis at Monash University, 
under supervised by Marika Vicziany and Associate 
Robert Rice.  
parties, and elected officials) are the agents. 
Meanwhile, in the second stage, elected 
politicians or government actors, legislatures, 
or judiciaries are principals and the public 
bureaucrats are the agents (Burki & Perry, 
1998: 122). However, many researchers have 
paid little attention to examine the relationship 
between role of the state and tax reform. 
Many economists argue that state is a 
dominant player in making and enforcing of 
the rule of the game. State in agency theory 
can be conceived as a nexus of contracts both 
internally with central government, province 
government and local government and 
externally, with local legislature, local 
government and local private sector. 
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Furthermore, the choice of contracts will 
depend on the cost of transaction and 
information and subject to behavioural 
assumption, i.e. bounded rationality and 
opportunism (Williamson, 1975). However, 
since information is asymmetrically distri-
buted, principal-agent relationship can give 
rise to adverse selection (hidden information) 
and moral hazard (hidden action). Therefore, 
state as a key player can potentially act as 
opportunistic behaviour. 
A simple neoclassical theory of the state 
can be used to explain the relationship 
between theory of the state and public finance 
(see also Jaya, 2004). There are two general 
types of explanation for the state exists: a 
contract theory and a predatory or exploitation 
theory. North (1991: 21) argues that a contract 
theory of the state based on the theorem of 
exchange in which the state plays the role of 
wealth maximiser for society. The contract 
theory approach offers an explanation for the 
development of efficient property rights that 
would promote economic growth or wealth. 
Meanwhile, the predatory theory of the state 
considers the state to be the agency of a group 
or class; its function, to extract income from 
the rest of the constituents in the interest of 
that group or class. The predatory state would 
specify a set of property rights that maximise 
the revenue of the group in power, regardless 
of its impact on the wealth of the society as a 
whole (North, 1991:22). Therefore this paper 
will use New Institutional Economics of the 
State to examine Indonesia local tax pre and 
post reform of Law No.34/2000 on Regional 
Taxes. 
TAX SYSTEM IN THE GLOBAL 
CONTEXT 
Based on the concept of fiscal 
decentralisation, local fiscal power is the 
power of local governments to make their own 
decisions about taxations and expenditures - 
that is the degree to which regional 
governments have independent control over 
their budgets (Burki et al., 1999; and Mahi, 
2003; Shah et al., 1994; Ter-Minassian, 1997). 
Some scholars argue that to evaluate local 
fiscal power one needs to study the four pillars 
of a fiscally decentralised system: tax or 
revenue assignment, expenditure assignment, 
intergovernmental transfers, and local 
government borrowing (Ebel & Yilmaz, 2002; 
Martinez & Vasquez, 2002; Shah, et al., 1994; 
Shah et al., 2004). The examples cited here 
are based on papers that appeared in Fiscal 
Federalism in Theory and Practice edited by 
Teresa Ter-Minassian (1997). Ter-Minassian 
provides a good overview of federal fiscalism 
as it works in various developed and 
underdeveloped countries.  
Tax assignment is the most important 
aspect to evaluate local fiscal power 
(Noregaard in Ter-Minassian, 1997). Ebel & 
Yilmaz (2002) assert that tax assignment is the 
allocation of tax responsibilities among 
multiple tiers of government. Musgrave (1983: 
2-19) points out that “there are seven princi-
ples in tax assignment, i.e. (1) progressive 
redistributive tax should be centralised, taxes 
suitable for economic stabilisation should be 
centralised; (2) unequal tax bases between 
jurisdictions should be centralised; (3) taxes 
on mobile factors of production should be 
centralised; (4) residence-based taxes, such as 
excise, should be levied by states; (5) taxes on 
completely immobile factors should be levied 
by local authorities; and (6) benefit taxes and 
user charges can be levied appropriately by all 
levels”. 
Some scholars use tax evaluation criteria 
to assess local fiscal power. Devas (1989) and 
Davey (1996) argue that from an adminis-
trative point of view there are six criteria for 
judging the appropriateness of tax assignment. 
These are adequacy and elasticity, equity, 
administrative feasibility, political accepta-
bility, economic efficiency, and suitability as 
local taxes. Similarly, Ebel & Yilmaz (2002) 
argue that from an economic point of view, 
the tax base (mobile/immobile), tax rate 
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(regressive/progressive), and the economic 
scale are the criteria for success in deter-
mining revenue assignment.  
The tax assignment system in the United 
States provided something of a model for the 
Indonesian reforms, although those reforms 
have not gone far enough along the American 
track. Stotsky & Sunley in Ter-Minassian 
(1997: 343-359) note that the United States 
has a decentralised tax administration with 
each federal, state, and local government 
having its own tax administration to collect 
the taxes it imposes. They also note that 
decentralisation gives each government 
maximum fiscal independence and control 
over the base and rates of its taxes. Property 
tax is usually collected and administered by 
state governments. Ter-Minassian (1997) also 
describes another US tax arrangement that 
runs parallel to the one just described. This is 
called piggyback system of taxation where, for 
instance, the federal government collects 
income tax and then gives a fixed 10 percent 
of that yield to local government. This 
piggyback or overlapping system seemed to 
inspire legal drafter of the Indonesian income 
tax law as stipulated in Law No. 17 of 2000. 
Despite this, local governments in Indonesia 
still have only a minimal role in controlling 
and administering the district tax base and tax 
rates. 
Japan’s tax assignment system also 
presents an interesting example for Indonesian 
officials to think about. Mihaljek in Ter-
Minassian (1997: 250-285) notes that local 
taxes are the greatest source of district revenue 
in Japan: about 35 percent, which is about 
three times the proportion of local taxes in the 
case of Indonesian districts. However, despite 
this the tax base and tax rates cannot be 
determined by local governments in Japan. At 
the same time, local governments do have 
some flexibility with certain taxes, provided 
that these are approved either formally or 
informally by the central Japanese govern-
ment. What Indonesia can learn from this is 
how to structure the tax system in a manner 
that gives local governments the capacity to 
raise a greater proportion of total revenue 
from local taxes. And as the Japanese case 
shows, this can be done in a way that is 
flexible and involves the central government 
as a monitor and ultimate authority.  
Australia’s decentralised system is 
another example that Indonesia might look to 
for a better understanding of the workings of a 
modern fiscal system in the context of a 
democratic society. Craig in Ter-Minassian 
(1997: 175) describes how the Commonwealth 
Government controls the four major high-
yielding taxes: personal income tax, customs 
and excise duties, company income tax, and 
sales tax. It left only low-yielding smaller 
revenue sources for state and municipal 
governments. For example, state governments 
control and administer property taxes which 
contribute almost 56 percent of state 
government revenue. Ter-Minassian (1997: 9) 
also points out that Australia espouses the 
principal of complete separation of the tax 
base for different levels of government. In 
Indonesia, by contrast, the central government 
has dominated the tax system by monopolising 
all the high-yielding tax sources including the 
property tax. This has resulted in a large 
vertical fiscal imbalance (Shah et al., 1994). 
In Australia there are also annual 
meetings of the state Premiers with the Prime 
Minister to discuss the fiscal formula used to 
allocate centrally-collected taxes back to the 
state governments. This provides the state 
governments with the chance to plead their 
case for altering the formula on a regular 
basis. Although the formula has been 
relatively stable in recent years, the annual 
process of consultation is an important part of 
Australian democracy. It also avoids the 
impression that the federal government 
controls all the fiscal resources of Australia 
without taking into account the opinions of 
state governments. The Premiers take the 
annual review very seriously and employ a 
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team of lawyers to present their views. For 
example, the State Government of Victoria 
retains a team of about 100 tax lawyers who 
work on the presentation of the Victorian case 
throughout the year so that at the annual 
meeting the state of Victoria can put the 
strongest possible argument for an increase in 
centrally-collected states to the state of 
Victoria (Dixon, May 2003). The Australian 
experience could well hold lessons for the 
Indonesian government when it comes to 
establishing a fiscal dialogue between central 
and local governments in a manner that 
promotes consultation and transparency. 
In contrast to Australia, Japan and the US, 
the Indian tax system is one that is marginally 
better than the Indonesian but it does not hold 
powerful lessons. Hemming, et al. in Ter-
Minassian (1997: 527-539) argue that tax 
assignment in India is based to a significant 
extent on the relative efficiency of the central 
and state governments in collecting taxes. 
Thus all central taxes are collected by the 
central tax authority and all state taxes by state 
tax authorities. As in Indonesia, the lower 
level governments have been assigned taxes 
from relatively immobile tax bases while the 
central government takes the highest yielding 
taxes. Thus New Delhi collects 100 percent of 
income tax, profit tax, excise duties and 
import duties. The state governments collect 
95 percent of sale taxes and 75 percent of 
other taxes. However, after applying the 
revenue sharing formula, 72 percent of income 
taxes and 45 percent of excise duties are 
distributed to the state governments 
(Hemming et al., 1997: 531). This appears to 
be much more generous than the Indonesian 
case where less than 25 percent of centrally 
collected revenues are redistributed beyond 
Jakarta. Despite these apparently favourable 
equations, the Indian tax system remains in 
serious difficulty as the persistent fiscal 
deficits at the state and central levels 
demonstrate. Underlying what seems to be a 
good system, is the failure of all governments 
to tax the rich peasants. This has proven to be 
politically too sensitive for any party to make 
into an election agenda. For all these reasons, 
the Indian example is not illuminating for 
Indonesia. 
Tax assignment in Argentina provides 
another example of a model that could be 
useful for Indonesia, at least in demonstrating 
how to increase locally generated revenues. 
Schwartz & Liuksila in Ter-Minassian (1997: 
388-423) argue that the Argentinean federal 
government collects the main taxes such as 
income tax, value added tax (VAT), excise 
taxes, foreign trade taxes, liquid fuel and 
energy taxes, gross assets tax, social security 
taxes, and a number of minor levies. 
Provincial and municipal governments collect 
real estate tax, automobile tax, road taxes & 
the provincial turnover tax. Schwartz and 
Liuksila note that in the Argentinean case 
provincial tax collection represents about 45 
percent of total provincial government 
revenue. This is much higher than in Indonesia 
because Indonesian provincial and district 
governments cannot levy their own property 
and turnover taxes.  
Overall, the experience of tax assignment 
in both developed and developing countries 
provides three important questions for the 
present paper on Indonesia. Who actually 
collects and administers the taxes and levies? 
Who determines the tax base and the rate of 
taxes? Should the central government continue 
to dominate the revenue system? 
INDONESIA TAX SYSTEM: PRE 
REFORM LAW NO.34/2000 AND POST 
REFORM LAW NO.34/2000 
One of the crucial elements in measuring 
the degree of regional autonomy is the power 
of regional governments to tax their 
population (Simanjuntak, 2002: 1). The larger 
the proportion of locally generated revenue, 
the more authority the local Kabupaten 
government can have. However, the majority 
of scholars working on this issue confirm that 
the role of locally generated revenue has been 
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very small in Indonesia for a long time. There 
is another way in verifying the power of the 
central government, i.e. through its control 
over the collection and distribution of tax and 
non-tax revenues. 
PRE REFORM 
Shah et al. (1994: 41) confirms that the 
collection of taxes was highly centralised 
because Jakarta insisted that the central 
government should control the most 
productive sources of revenue. Table 1 
confirms his analysis but also takes that 
analysis one step further by including 
information about non-tax revenues. For the 
rest of this chapter, the analysis of the power 
of Jakarta is based on both of these sources of 
financial power: tax and non-tax revenue. To 
my knowledge, no scholar working on 
Indonesia until now has generated an analysis 
that seeks to summarise the total revenue 
powers of the central state. 
Table 1 shows that oil and gas revenues 
(the main form of non-tax income), income 
taxes, property taxes, value-added taxes and 
taxes from international trade were all 
collected by Jakarta and retained by the 
central government as part of the central 
budget (Table 1). Table 1 also shows that 
central government decided what the tax base 
was going to be, the specific rate of taxation 
and the administration of tax and non-tax 
revenue collection. Even in the case of other 
revenue, rents from mines and royalties from 
forest for example, Jakarta retained the bulk of 
taxes collected: 65 and 55 percent 
respectively. 
After Jakarta, it was the provincial 
governments that benefited most and the 
Kabupaten district and municipal governments 
the least. For example, Table 1 shows that in 
the case of forestry licenses and mining 
royalties the provincial government received 
56 percent of the total revenues collected by 
the central government and that a mere 14 
percent went to district governments. In these 
two cases, the central government retained the 
minor share of revenues raised, yet still local 
government received hardly anything. 
Moreover, as we show in the next section the 
actual revenue yield from these two sources 
was relatively small compared with the large 
revenue earners. District governments only 
received the lion’s share of total revenues in a 
single instance, the land and building tax 
where 64.8 percent went to district 
governments compared to 16.2 percent to 
provincial government and the 19 percent that 
was retained by the central government.  
Table 2 compares the share that the 
various levels of government had in the total 
revenue collection system of Indonesia. The 
Table provides powerful evidence for the 
argument that Indonesia suffered from 
massive vertical revenue imbalances in the pre 
reform tax era in 1990/1991: the central 
government collected 95 percent of the 
consolidated domestic revenue of Indonesia 
compared with just over three percent by the 
provincial governments and a more one 
percent by district and municipal 
governments. 
The actual yields of these revenues also 
confirm the argument that the centre had a 
virtual monopoly over the revenue system of 
Indonesia because it controlled all high 
yielding tax sources and left only low 
yielding, smaller revenue sources for the 
provincial and Kabupaten governments. In the 
period 1990-1991 and 1997-1998 some shifts 
in the importance of certain revenue sources 
did manifest themselves. For example, during 
the early 1990s non-tax receipts from oil and 
gas resources constituted the single largest 
source of revenue in Jakarta (42 percent of 
total revenues) and 100 percent of this revenue 
remained in the hands of central government. 
By the late 1990s, however, revenue from 
income taxes had doubled to 36 percent of all 
national revenues and the yield from gas and 
oil resources had fallen to some 16 percent of 
the total. This paper is not concerned with the 
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changing nature of Indonesian revenues in the 
pre reform era, so at this stage there is no 
obvious answer to the question of why these 
shifts were taking place. Rather the point of 
this analysis is to show how during the 1990s, 
despite the shifting nature of domestic 
revenue, the central government of Indonesia 
continued to control both tax and non-tax 
sources of government income and how that 
control was ensured by central dominance 
over all high yielding revenue sources. 
Another way of verifying this central 
dominance is to look more closely at the 
capacity of Kabupaten governments to 
generate new revenue from Kabupaten 
sources. 
 
Table 1. Tax Assignment and Revenue Sharing in Indonesia, Pre Reform 34/2000 
Revenue 
Responsibility Distribution of Revenues 
Base Rate Adm Centre Province District 
 
CENTRAL GOVT TAXES 
Income taxes 
Value-added taxes 
Import duties 
Excise 
Export tax 
 
NATURAL RESOURCES 
Oil and gas receipts 
Land and building tax 
Forestry royalties 
Forestry licenses 
Mining land rents 
Mining royalties 
 
DATI I OR PROVINCIAL TAX 
    Motor vehicles registration and transfer taxes 
 
DATI II OR DISTRICT AND MUNICIPAL 
TAXES 
Hotel and restaurant tax 
Entertainment taxes 
Street lighting taxes 
Advertisement taxes 
Bus. regristration tax 
Radio tax 
Slaughter house tax 
Other district taxes and charges 
 
 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
 
 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
 
 
C,P 
 
 
 
C 
C,P 
C,P,L 
C,P 
C,P 
C,P 
C,P 
C,P 
 
 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
 
 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
 
 
C,P 
 
 
 
C 
C,P,L 
C,P,L 
C,P,L 
C,P,L 
C,P,L 
C,P,L 
C,P,L 
 
 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
 
 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
 
 
P 
 
 
 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
L 
 
 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
 
 
100.00 
19.00 
55.00 
30.00 
65.00 
30.00 
 
 
0.0 
 
 
 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
. 
 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
 
 
0.0 
16.2 
30.0 
56.0 
19.0 
56.0 
 
 
100.0 
 
 
 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
 
 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
 
 
0.0 
64.9 
15.0 
14.0 
16.0 
14.0 
 
 
0.0 
 
 
 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
100.0 
Notes:  
C  = Central government 
P  = Provincial Government (Dati I) 
L  = District Government (Dati II) 
Base  = The tax base is the population obliged to pay the tax according to the law. 
Rate  = The rate is the level of taxation 
Adm  = The administrative system for collecting the tax. 
Source: Shah et al. (1994: 42) 
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Table 2. Value and Proportion of Taxes Collected by various Levels of Government from 
Various Tax Bases in 1990/1991 compared with 1997/1998 in Trillion Rupiah 
 
Level of Government 
Total Value of 
Taxes Collected in 
1990/1991* 
Percentage 
of 
Total Value of 
Taxes Collected in 
1997/1998** 
Percentage 
of 
I. Central Government  39.3 95.3 87.7 93.5 
I.A. Tax     
a. Income Tax 6.7 16.3 29.1 31.0 
b. Value Added Tax 7.4 18.0 24.6 26.2 
c. Import Duty 2.4 6.0 3.3 3.5 
d. Excise Duties 1.9 4.6 4.4 4.7 
e. Export Tax 0.04 0.1 0.1 0.1 
f. Property Tax 0.8 0.6 2.5 2.7 
g. Other Taxes 0.2 2.0 0.6 0.7 
I.B. Non Tax Receipt 
(natural resources) 
    
a. Oil and Gas Receipts 17.7 42.6 14.9 15.8 
b. Others 2.1 5.1 8.2 8.8 
II.  Province (Dati I) 1.4 3.4 4.1 4.4 
a. Vehicles Tax 0.9 2.4 3.0 3.2 
b. Charges 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 
c. Others 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.7 
III. Local (Dati II) 0.5 1.3 1.7 1.9 
a. Taxes 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.7 
b. Charges 0.3 0.7 0.8 0.9 
c .Others 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Total Tax and Charges: 
I+II+III 
41.2 100 93.5 100 
Source: * Shah et al. (1994: 43) and ** Simanjuntak (2002) 
From the viewpoint of good local 
governance, decentralisation reforms may be 
more far reaching. However, the public sector 
as an interlocking set of institutions cannot be 
re-engineered at will over a short period 
(Dick, 2000). Indeed, the problem of 
accountability and transparent budget at the 
local level could also be compounded by 
possible abuses of power and corruption. 
Legislature and judiciary at the local level are 
considered too weak to prevent local 
bureaucracy from such (Brojonegoro & 
Asanuma, 2000).  
Indeed, there are several deviations and 
corruption over the management of local 
revenue (Jaya et al., 2000). For examples are 
tax officer and tax payer collusion, no 
administration order in tax collection, target 
determining in tax revenue manipulated, 
illegal collection and corruption, collusion and 
nepotism especially on part of the profit local 
enterprise (BUMD). Moreover, there was 
collusion between local government executive 
and local legislative on local budget 
ratification, we called this “Pertemuan 
setengah kamar” (budget compromise 
between Bupati/Major with head of 
legislative).   
AFTER REFORM 
Table 3 shows that the central government 
controlled the whole revenue system even if it 
 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia April 
 
128 
did not collect the revenues because they 
determined the tax base, the rate of taxes and 
tax administration. 
The second and third sections of Table 4 
show the revenues that were raised by 
provincial, district and municipal 
governments. Clearly, the power of Jakarta 
was ensured by the restricted capacity of all 
Kabupaten governments to raise their own 
revenue as this Table demonstrates. The 
restriction arose in the first instance from the 
lack of taxable items. For example motor 
vehicle registration, transfer taxes on vehicles 
registration and transfer title taxes on vehicles 
were the only locally generated source of 
revenue controlled by provincial governments. 
District and municipal government had a 
wider range of tax sources that they could 
draw on but the total yield from these was 
very small as we shall see shortly. Table 4 
shows that locally generated revenue at the 
district and provincial levels remained small in 
proportion to centrally generated revenue 
largely because it was confined to a limited 
range of economic activity. Almost 95 percent 
of the total revenue of Indonesia in 2002 was 
raised and collected by the Central 
Government and only three percent by the 
provincial government and about two per cent 
by the Kabupaten or district governments. 
 
Table 3. Tax Assignment and Revenue Sharing Arrangements/Formula in Indonesia: A 
Comparison of the Pre and Post Reform Years: 1993 and 2000 
 
Item 
Central 
government 
Provincial 
Government 
 
Resources 
Producing 
District 
Government 
Other District 
Govt in the 
same province 
All District 
Govt in 
Indonesia 
1993 2000 1993 2000 1993 2000 1993 2000 1993 2000 
Tax and Non Tax and 
Sharing 
     
Income   100          80 0              8                                        12 
Value added   100        100 0              0    
Import duties  100        100 0              0    
Export   100        100 0              0    
Excise  100        100 0              0    
Land and building*  19           20* 16. 2        16   64.8           64 
Property Tax**  19           19** 16.2       16.2   64.8        64.8 
Natural Resource 
revenue sharing 
     
Oil  100         85 -                  3                      6                   6  
LNG  100         70 -                  6                    12                 12      
Mining: Land rent    65         20 19.0          16                    64                   0 16 
Mining: royalty    30         20 56             16                    32                 32 14 
Forestry: land rent    55         20 30             16                    64                    0   15 
Forestry: provision    30         20 56             16                    32                 32 14 
Fishery    -            20                     80                     
Note * 20 percent distributed equally to all districts, ** 10 percent distributed to districts and 9 percent for tax collection 
Source: Shah et al., 1994, Law 25/1999 and Government Regulation 104/2000 
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Table 4. The Total Value of All Revenue Collected by Various Levels of Government from 
Various Sources and Tax Bases in the Calendar Year 2002 (in Trillion Rupiah) 
Level of Government 
Total Value of 
Revenue Collected in 
2002 
Percentage of revenue from each 
source relative to total revenue in 
2002 
I. Central Government  301.6 94.9 
I.A. Taxes   
a. Income Tax non Oil and 
Gas Receipts 
88.8 27.9 
b. Income Tax oil and gas 15.7 4.9 
c. Value Added Tax 70.1 22.1 
d. Import Duty 12.2 3.8 
e. Excise Duties 22.4 7.1 
f. Export Tax 0.3 0.1 
g. Property Tax 8.1 2.6 
h. Other Tax 1.9 0.6 
I.B. Non-Tax Receipts   
i. Oil revenues 44.0 13.8 
j. Natural gas 14.5 4.6 
k. Mining 1.3 0.4 
l.Forestry 3.0 0.9 
m. Fishery 0.3 0.1 
n. Non natural resources 19.0 6.0 
II. Provincial 9.6 3.0 
a. Vehicles Tax 8.6 2.7 
b. Charges 0.6 0.2 
c. Others 0.4 0.1 
III. District 6.7 2.1 
a. Taxes 2.3 0.7 
b. Charges 2,2 0.7 
C .Others 2,2 0.7 
Total Taxes and Charges: 
I+II+III 
All the percentages in  
cols. 3 and 5 are calculated as 
proportions of 100 % at the 
bottom of this table 
317.9 100 
Source:  Calculated from Central Bureau of Statistics, Government of Indonesia, Statistical Year Book of 
Indonesia, (2002: 417) and Central Bureau of Statistics, Government of Indonesia, Financial 
Statistics of District/Municipality Government (2002: 4) 
 
However, in-depth interviews in these 
three Kabupatens: Sleman, Badung, and 
Kupang, confirm that local perceptions of the 
new reforms law 34/2000 have been viewed 
both positively and negatively. On the 
negative side is the perception that Kabupaten 
governments have become “more revenue 
hungry” by issuing a plethora of regional taxes 
and charges. Some other scholars have also 
supported this finding. Hofman & Kaiser 
(2002) wrote that Kabupaten governments 
after becoming revenue hungry introduced 
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nuisance and predatory local taxes. (The 
World Bank, 2003) The World Bank found in 
2003 that more than 2000 regulations on 
Kabupaten taxes and charges have conflicted 
with Law 34. Taxes on the movement of 
goods from one Kabupaten to another were of 
great concern to the central government 
because of their adverse effect on the 
economy, by causing fewer realisations of 
economics of specialisation and increased 
allocative inefficiency. Therefore we can 
argue that transfer of fiscal power has not been 
followed by a transfer of monitoring 
accountability, resulting in a transfer of abuse 
fiscal power.  
POLICY ISSUES IN LOCAL TAX 
REFORM 
The New Institutional Economics is an 
important analytical tool to analyze a state 
transformation. The new reforming 
institutions in local tax will determine the non-
price incentives for the behaviour of 
individuals and organisations, particularly, in 
public administration and they can solve 
information and enforcement problems 
(agency problem). However, when the state 
agency behaves in predatory manner and rules 
of the game are unstable and changing, it is 
difficult to define appropriately incentives and 
to monitor devices in fiscal contracts between 
principal and agents. The choice of fiscal 
contracts will depend on the transaction cost. 
When information is asymmetrically 
distributed, principal-agent relationship can 
give rise to adverse selection (hidden 
information) and moral hazard (hidden action) 
such as cheating, shirking, opportunism and 
problems of agency. As a result, these 
conditions create high transaction cost. In fact, 
in the context of the behaviour of State 
agencies, potential corruption, collusion and 
nepotism are evidence of organisational 
dysfunction, stemming from weakness in the 
institutional framework. 
The analysis in this paper has revealed a 
major contradiction in the reforms introduced 
in 1999: despite political and administrative 
decentralisation, district governments remain 
financially weak. They have limited fiscal 
power. Despite a great expansion in the 
number of local taxes and cesses, the revenue 
yielding capacity of local grants is relatively 
small. The result is that the central Indonesian 
government continues to control the highest 
yielding taxes and as a result remains the 
dominant fiscal authority in the land. This 
characteristic of the new revenue system needs 
further qualification. The revenue collecting 
capacity of the district governments is weak 
and they received the smaller share of total 
centrally collected revenues. Nevertheless, at 
the same time their decision making power 
over what the centrally allocated funds spent 
are used for has increased significantly. In 
particular, it is up to the Kabupaten 
governments to decide on the allocation 
between routine and development projects and 
what proportion of the local budgets can be 
allocated to increasing or decreasing the 
number of civil servants attached to its offices. 
Paradoxically, this local flexibility has also 
opened the doors to further corruption and 
nepotism at the district level. 
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